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The Dynamics of Political Compromise, Political Institutions and Economic Policies

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dc.description.abstract I explore how political cooperation relates to institutional as well as economic policy developments, and how these in turn affect the dynamics of political cooperation. To do this I build a stylized model where parties with different preferences set policies and invest in political institutions. In the model institutions are explicitly defined as endogenous constraints on the possibility of reneging on political promises. After an improvement in the conditions for cooperation the model generates a dynamic path of institutional development that allows for increasing cooperation and policy convergence. During the transition the gains from acquiring power decrease and policies are too conservative, meaning that the tax rate is lower than the one preferred by the median voter. Although the bias decreases in the transition it may persist in the long-run. en
dc.title The Dynamics of Political Compromise, Political Institutions and Economic Policies en
dc.contributor.author Aguirre, Alvaro
dc.date.accessioned 2018-02-09T02:44:09Z
dc.date.available 2018-02-09T02:44:09Z
dc.date.issued 2018-02-09
dc.identifier.uri http://lacer.lacea.org/handle/123456789/64508
lacea.language.supported en
dc.description Working paper
dc.language.iso en
dc.subject Political Institutions
dc.subject Economic Policies
dc.subject Political Compromise
dc.type Working Paper


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