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To Redistribute or Not: A Politician`s Dilemma

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dc.contributor.author Velasques de Paula Machado, Fabiana en
dc.description.abstract A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies in a democracy is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. To evaluate the prospects of such an outcome, this paper develops a theory exploring two fundamental factors at play during elections - the critical political stage where citizens choose their representatives. The first is the lack of information about the policy inclinations of candidates. The second refers to two motivations compelling candidates into politics (and possibly at odds with each other): the opportunity to implement one's favored policies or to extract rents. Results indicate the existence of an equilibrium where high inequality and low redistribution can coexist. The theory's assumptions and outcomes are explored empirically using individual-level data collected in presidential election years in Brazil. en
dc.format.extent 51 en
dc.subject Fiscal Policy en
dc.subject Public Administration & Policy Making en
dc.title To Redistribute or Not: A Politician`s Dilemma en
dc.identifier.jel C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General en
dc.identifier.jel C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General en
dc.identifier.jel D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior en
dc.coverage.placename Brazil en
dc.contributor.other RES-DOCS-USER
dc.date.accessioned 2012-10-03T19:35:21Z
dc.date.available 2012-10-03T19:35:21Z
dc.date.issued 2012-09-06
dc.identifier.uri http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101.html?id=58966
dc.format.medium ACROBAT
dc.language.iso en
dc.relation.ispartof http://thesaurus.iadb.org/publicthesauri/164234778652267151389344
dc.subject Voting behavior, Uncertainty, Political ideology, Redistribution
dc.type Working Papers
lacea.language.supported en
dc.date.modified 2016-12-01T16:54:33Z
dc.description.abstract2 A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies in a democracy is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. To evaluate the prospects of such an outcome, this pa- per develops a theory exploring two fundamental factors at play during elections ¿ the critical political stage where citizens choose their representatives. The first is the lack of information about the policy inclinations of candidates. The second refers to two motivations compelling candidates into politics (and possibly at odds with each other): the opportunity to implement one¿s favored policies or to extract rents. Results indicate the existence of an equilibrium where high inequality and low redistribution can coexist. The theory¿s assumptions and outcomes are explored empirically using individual-level data collected in presidential election years in Brazil.


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