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Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

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dc.contributor.author Wren-Lewis, Liam
dc.date.accessioned 2013-09-27T20:52:06Z
dc.date.available 2013-09-27T20:52:06Z
dc.date.issued 2013-08
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15925
dc.description.abstract This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and governance at the sector level. A simple model illustrates how both an increase in regulatory autonomy and privatization may influence the effect of corruption. The interaction is analyzed empirically using a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995--2007. Greater corruption is associated with lower firm labor productivity, but this association is reduced when an independent regulatory agency is present. These results survive a range of robustness checks, including instrumenting for regulatory governance, controlling for a large range of observables, and using several different corruption measures. The association between corruption and productivity also appears weaker for privately owned firms compared to publicly owned firms, though this result is somewhat less robust. en
dc.language English
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relation.ispartofseries Policy Research Working Paper;No.6559
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject DEREGULATION
dc.subject MACROECONOMICS
dc.subject INEFFICIENCY
dc.subject CRISES
dc.subject UNEMPLOYMENT
dc.subject GOVERNMENT DECISION
dc.subject INCREASING RETURNS
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES
dc.subject ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subject CONSUMERS
dc.subject SECTORAL POLICIES
dc.subject REGULATORY AGENCY
dc.subject ELASTICITY
dc.subject ANTI-CORRUPTION
dc.subject POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject CITIZENS
dc.subject POLITICAL STABILITY
dc.subject COUNTRY DATA
dc.subject DISCRETION
dc.subject FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
dc.subject LEGISLATURE
dc.subject POLITICIANS
dc.subject PROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subject LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
dc.subject AUDITS
dc.subject POOR PERFORMANCE
dc.subject NATIONAL LEVEL
dc.subject TRANSPORT
dc.subject PRIVATIZATION
dc.subject CORRUPTION COSTS
dc.subject POLITICAL ELITES
dc.subject REVERSE CAUSALITY
dc.subject CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subject DEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subject COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
dc.subject BEST PRACTICES
dc.subject DIVISION OF POWERS
dc.subject GDP PER CAPITA
dc.subject URBANIZATION
dc.subject REAL GDP
dc.subject CORRUPT POLITICIANS
dc.subject FINANCIAL SECTOR
dc.subject GOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subject RULE OF LAW
dc.subject EMPLOYMENT
dc.subject PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
dc.subject ECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subject MONOPOLIES
dc.subject SOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subject HUMAN RIGHTS
dc.subject CAPACITY BUILDING
dc.subject PRIVATISATION
dc.subject LABOR MARKET
dc.subject PUBLIC DEBT
dc.subject LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
dc.subject DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subject PERSONAL GAIN
dc.subject DEPOSITS
dc.subject LEGAL ORIGIN
dc.subject WAGES
dc.subject CORRUPT
dc.subject GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
dc.subject POLITICAL RIGHTS
dc.subject GOVERNANCE COMPONENT
dc.subject DEMOCRACY
dc.subject DECISION-MAKING
dc.subject RULING PARTY
dc.subject REGULATORY CAPTURE
dc.subject AUDITING
dc.subject ECONOMICS
dc.subject TRANSPARENT REGULATION
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
dc.subject SEPARATION OF POWERS
dc.subject ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
dc.subject GDP
dc.subject BUSINESS CLIMATE
dc.subject GOVERNANCE COMPONENTS
dc.subject INCOME
dc.subject TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject CONFIDENCE
dc.subject GOVERNMENT REGULATION
dc.subject GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
dc.subject MOTIVATIONS
dc.subject CORRUPTION
dc.subject BANK DEPOSITS
dc.subject AUTONOMY
dc.subject COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
dc.subject BRIBERY
dc.subject ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
dc.subject CORRUPTION LEVELS
dc.subject INVESTIGATION
dc.subject TOTAL COSTS
dc.subject REGULATORY QUALITY
dc.subject CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
dc.subject ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
dc.subject INFLATION
dc.subject ENTERPRISE REFORM
dc.subject BENCHMARKING
dc.subject BRIBE
dc.subject PRESIDENCY
dc.subject CIVIL LIBERTIES
dc.subject GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
dc.subject TELECOMMUNICATIONS
dc.subject POLITICIAN
dc.subject EXPORTS
dc.subject JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
dc.subject LEGAL ORIGINS
dc.subject EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
dc.subject MUNICIPALITIES
dc.subject INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
dc.subject FUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subject REGULATORY POLICY
dc.subject STATE ENTERPRISE
dc.subject ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
dc.subject POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject PUBLIC UTILITIES
dc.title Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean en
dc.rights.holder World Bank


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