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Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore

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dc.contributor.author Vittas, Dimitri
dc.date.accessioned 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z
dc.date.available 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z
dc.date.issued 1996-02
dc.identifier.citation Viewpoint. -- Note no. 72 (February 1996)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11631
dc.description.abstract In most countries, participation in a public pension system involving some kind of redistribution is compulsory, while participation in private pension schemes is voluntary. There are growing fears in many countries that the value of public pensions will not be sustained. There are similar fears about company pensions. The credibility of company pensions depends on the integrity and solvency of large employers, which can no longer be taken for granted. These problems point to a need to refine compulsory saving. Drawing on the experiences of countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, this Note provides some guidance on answering the following questions: 1) Whom to compel? 2) Defined contribution or benefit? 3) How large should compulsory contributions be? 4) Who should manage the funds? 5) What types of regulation are appropriate? 6) What state guarantees for what system? 7) How to offer tax incentives? en
dc.language English
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries Viewpoint
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject AGENTS
dc.subject LOW INFLATION
dc.subject ANNUITIES
dc.subject SAFETY
dc.subject RESERVES
dc.subject INVESTMENT RETURN
dc.subject INTEGRITY
dc.subject REPLACEMENT RATE
dc.subject MORAL HAZARD
dc.subject INVESTMENT GUIDELINES
dc.subject PREMIUMS
dc.subject MINIMUM PERIOD
dc.subject MANAGERS
dc.subject FRAUD
dc.subject DISCRIMINATION
dc.subject RETIREMENT
dc.subject PENSION FUND
dc.subject PENSION FUNDS
dc.subject PENSION SYSTEM
dc.subject SOCIAL SECURITY
dc.subject OPERATING COSTS
dc.subject COVERAGE
dc.subject EMPLOYMENT
dc.subject PROFITABILITY
dc.subject PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS
dc.subject INSURANCE COMPANIES
dc.subject CAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subject INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
dc.subject RATES
dc.subject CAPITALIZATION
dc.subject HOUSING
dc.subject COMPULSORY SAVING
dc.subject PRIVATE PENSION
dc.subject PENSION SCHEMES
dc.subject RISK TAKING
dc.subject STATE GUARANTEES
dc.subject COMMISSIONS
dc.subject CONTRIBUTION RATE
dc.subject PRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subject INCOME
dc.subject DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
dc.subject DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES
dc.subject SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
dc.subject COMPANY PENSIONS
dc.subject ANNUITY
dc.subject INVESTMENT POLICY
dc.subject WAGE GROWTH
dc.subject PENSIONS
dc.subject TAX RATE
dc.subject INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
dc.subject INFLATION
dc.subject WORKERS PENSIONS
dc.subject TAX INCENTIVES
dc.subject TAX EXEMPTION
dc.subject PRIVATE PILLAR
dc.subject NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE
dc.subject FIDUCIARY
dc.subject INSURANCE
dc.subject PENALTIES
dc.subject SOLVENCY
dc.subject MARKETING
dc.subject PUBLIC PILLAR
dc.subject MANDATORY RETIREMENT
dc.subject INVESTMENT RETURNS
dc.subject LIFE EXPECTANCY
dc.title Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore en
dc.rights.holder World Bank


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