

**Eliciting women's willingness to take a job  
Evidence from displaced and extreme poor women in Cali, Colombia<sup>1</sup>**

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This paper constitutes an experimental analysis of labor market preferences among women living in extreme poverty who have been displaced by violence in Cali, the third largest city in Colombia. Each of these women belongs to the government program Red UNIDOS. In this experiment we elicit the choices that these women make regarding a constant daily income from working at home in small and low-productivity businesses (such as cooking, sewing, and so on) against increasing their daily income by working outside the home as an employee, subject to the number of hours away from home, type of job (formal or informal), price of transportation and the cost of care or supervision for children and/or adolescents. A total of 377 women participated in the experiment, with 70 percent having arrived in Cali due to displacement by violence and 30 percent being considered extremely poor under the Colombian scoring mechanism SISBEN. Results indicate that regardless of the wage level of their partner or husband, married women are less willing to take a job outside of the home despite offers of increasing wages and free childcare. This is particularly true for women with children aged less than five years and adolescents. The price and the quality of care, followed by their fear of gang recruitment among adolescents and the price and availability of transportation, provide the main explanations for such choices. However, taking into account the aforementioned barriers, women are more willing to take a job outside of the home if it offers pension and health benefits.

Keywords: Displaced and extreme poor women, Red Unidos Colombia, Willingness to take a job,

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## 1. Introduction

Currently, 30.6% of Colombia's population lives under the poverty line and 9.1% under extreme poverty (DANE, 2013). There are instead 24.8% Multidimensional<sup>2</sup> poor individuals, of whom 18.5% live in urban areas and 49.9% in rural ones. Extreme poverty is always higher in rural areas (19.1%) vs. 6% in medium and large cities. Women represent 31% of the extreme poor in cities while men, 28.8%. The situation in rural areas is even grimmer, where men present 44% and women 48%. While labor force participation in urban areas is 57.8% among women, it is 74.5% among men. This situation is more acute in rural areas, where only 39.3% of women participate in the labor market, compared to 75.9% of men (DANE, 2014).

By 2012 it was estimated that there were 3,943,500 individuals displaced by violence (UNHCR, 2012), which is about 8% of Colombia's population. This population, forced to leave their villages due to loss of property, threats on their lives, family members assassinated and/or local massacres perpetuated by illegal armed groups such as the paramilitaries and guerrillas, became poor or extremely poor in urban areas, and in need of special government assistance.

Poverty is not only an income deprivation but also a multidimensional phenomenon that includes a series of deprivations in terms of education, health, public services and assets (Alkire & Ibrahim, 2007). Another dimension of poverty is subjective and psychological, since, despite the availability of social services and programs, living continuously in scarcity also changes one's decision-making and empowerment of taking action to improve one's life. This is why, providing financial resources and even social programs or services does not necessarily lead to ending extreme poverty in the short run, because extremely poor families lack fundamental organizational skills for their own development. Such skills are obviously important for a variety

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<sup>2</sup> As measured by the Colombian version of the Multidimensional Poverty Index.

of reasons, but one is that in Colombia, the poorest households do not benefit from the welfare system partly because they either do not register for the existing services, they are not aware of them, or they don't know how to enroll in the programs. The reasons behind this may be just due to lack of information, lack of self-esteem, or the more fundamental inability to understand and use welfare services. Furthermore, this population is so detached from the social protection system that is extremely hard to design programs that have any impact on them.

That is why poverty reduction strategies must bring together the supply and demand of social services, developing the organizational skills of individuals, their self-esteem, and awareness of the main goals to achieve in order to improve their quality of life. Inspired by Chile Solidario, the Red UNIDOS program represents Colombia's main strategy for the alleviation of extreme poverty and comprises three components: first, psychosocial support for families and the community; second, supply management and preferential access to social services provided by the state; and third, local institutional strengthening. A social worker (called *Cogestor social*) works with families to help them recognize their own strengths and weaknesses and devise strategies, adapted to their specific situation, through which they can work to escape extreme poverty through the achievement of some goals. Red UNIDOS operates across nine dimensions, namely identification, income and employment, education and training, health, nutrition, housing, family dynamics, banking and savings, and access to justice, with each family committing to a working plan with a set of minimum conditions that are to be met in a timely manner. The idea behind this strategy is that with the help of psychosocial support and social service supply management these families, who live in extreme poverty and are subject to displacement by violence, will become the managers of their own development.

Despite the attractiveness of its design, previous *Red UNIDOS* impact evaluations have shown few if any positive effects for female empowerment, and female labor participation in both the formal and informal sectors (Abramovsky et al., 2014; (Econometría, IFS, Fedesarrollo & SEI, 2012)). Some improvements are solely concentrated on low productivity entrepreneurs, in which case some women have benefited from preferential access to low cost microcredits (Martinez-Restrepo et al., 2014).

Regardless of the operational challenges of *Red UNIDOS*, some crucial questions remained unanswered about its impact, particularly, how complex it is to change the structural, mental, and behavioral barriers of women operating under extreme poverty, having faced scarcity. Why is it that women in extreme poverty and in urgent need of extra income, prefer to stay at home, or to work less hours than men? Is there an intra-household bargaining over women's labor decisions? Are they forced to do so by their partners? Are they constrained by structural and behavioral conditions associated with poverty, such as distance to working centers, access to transportation, or low self-esteem? What is their role in childcare decision-making?

Indeed, qualitative evidence suggests that, in addition to lack of local social services supply and operational problems, *Red UNIDOS* has not yet managed to reduce or remove some of the barriers that are faced by women under extreme poverty on a daily basis and which affect their labor decisions (Martinez-Restrepo et al., 2014). Evidence from urban settings suggests that first, it's due to the paucity of cost and trust concerning care services; second, of time, cost and accessibility to transportation; and third, due to violence and gang recruitment among adolescents, which are key determinants of women's labor decisions, as well as behavioral barriers (Martinez-Restrepo et al., 2014; (Econometría, IFS, Fedesarrollo & SEI, 2012). For these reasons, an overwhelming number of women prefer not to work at all, despite their extreme

need for income. Alternatively, in the best-case scenario they prefer to work from home or close to the home, be self-employed within the informal sector, and engage in low-productivity activities (cooking and selling food, sewing, hand washing clothing for neighbors, and so on).

This paper constitutes an experimental analysis of labor market preferences and decisions among women living in extreme poverty, or that have been displaced by violence in Cali, the third largest city in Colombia. To elicit the labor preferences and choices of these women we performed an experiment in which several hypothetical scenarios were applied and from which we measured their willingness to take a job, given several constraints. The women had to choose between working from home and being self-employed in the informal sector for a constant income of USD \$6 per day, or working outside the home for a salary that increased according to the number of hours worked. The latter scenario entails a total of USD \$6 for four hours of work and up to USD \$16 for 10 hours of work, increasing by USD \$2 per each additional hour worked. For each hypothetical scenario, the women had to take into consideration the following: 1) An increasing wage, given an increasing number of hours away from the home, inclusive of commuting time; 2) A constant USD \$1.5 cost of transportation; and 3) An increasing cost for care and supervision. In the first hypothetical round, all of the outside jobs were informal and in the second hypothetical round, all of the jobs were formal and included health and pension benefits.

A total of 370 women participated in the experiment, with 70 percent having arrived in Cali due to displacement by violence, and 30 percent being considered extremely poor under the Colombian poverty scoring mechanism called SISBEN. Among these women, one third were head of a household, one third were married women who did not have their husbands present during the experiment, and the remaining, were married women who did have their husbands

present during the experiment. Results indicate that that regardless of the wage level of their partner or husband, married women are less willing to take a job outside of the home despite offers of increasing wages and free childcare. This is particularly true for women with children aged less than five years and adolescents (13 to 17 years). Women who constitute the head of a household are more willing to take a part-time job outside of the home. In the case of increasing childcare and supervision costs, women are significantly less willing to leave the home, despite increasing wages. The price and the quality of care, followed by their fear of gang recruitment among adolescents and the price and availability of transportation, provide the main explanations for such choices. However, taking into account the aforementioned barriers, all women are more willing to take a job outside of the home if it offers pension and health benefits

## **2. Extreme Poverty and the Red UNIDOS Strategy in Colombia**

People living in extreme poverty and those displaced frequently have multiple needs (psychological, social, and economic) that require a wide range of coordinated services from multiple areas (education, health, identification, income generation) and support from many fronts (service supply, preferential service access, and psychosocial support). These challenges, added to the lack of services provided in the vicinity where the extreme poor live in rural and urban areas, make it difficult for them to connect with and benefit from social assistance programs. Red UNIDOS was designed to fulfill these multiple needs of the extreme poor and the displaced population in Colombia. This is an integral and coordinated national strategy that seeks to improve the conditions of life for families in extreme poverty. This strategy aims as well at accumulating social and human capital in order to reduce the levels of extreme poverty in the country. One of the rationales of this strategy is that families in extreme poverty are not benefiting from existing government programs that could help them reduce their vulnerability.

This is why Red UNIDOS does not provide cash transfers, but acts as a bridge between people who are part of the strategy and government programs that can help to reduce their vulnerabilities (lack of identification, income generation, human capital deprivation, and health among many others) and empower them to become agents of their own change.

Red UNIDOS comprises of three main components: 1) psychosocial support, 2) priority access to social benefits, and 3) institutional strengthening and social services delivery. For the first component, ten thousand social workers around the country, called *Cogestores Sociales*, work individually with the targeted families to identify their strengths and weaknesses in order to devise a strategy to achieve the necessary goals that will pull them out of extreme poverty. They are recruited and trained by national or local providers<sup>3</sup>, and are often social workers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, teachers, nurses, etc.<sup>4</sup> The work of each *cogestor social* is divided into several stages in which a progressive approach is made. The main idea behind this strategy is that the families themselves will be responsible for designing their development strategy.

The first step is the presentation of the strategy, a group interview in which each *Cogestor Social* advises on the program and explains the importance of the visits and goal achievements. The second step is the signature of responsibility commitment where each family commits to work for their family plan and each *Cogestor Social* commits to effectively give the needed support to each family. The third step is when the *Cogestor Social* gathers a family baseline with a questionnaire that has the necessary information to know whether each family has met each of the goals. Then, based on the family situation and on the baseline, some

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<sup>3</sup> Some departments have local providers called “Operadores”, and others with less institutional capabilities are run at the national level by ANSPE in Bogotá.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix A for all *cogestores sociales* characteristics.

achievements and priorities for the family are established and the *Cogestor Social* helps them elaborate a plan in order to accomplish them. This strategy involves the achievement of 45 basic goals along nine dimensions: identification, income and labor, education and training, health, nutrition, conditions of the household, family dynamics, bank accounts and savings, and access to justice<sup>5</sup>. Each *Cogestor Social* does a follow-up to see the status of the goals following the plan established previously and provide information to the families of existing government provided programs that could help to achieve their goals.

This psychosocial support is carried out through visits to the household for a maximum period of 5 years. By design, each *Cogestor Social* visits the family between 2 (control group) and 8 (maximum 5 for classic treatment and maximum 8 for intense treatment) times within a period of 3 months, not counting the initial assessment visit. The intensity of the visits decreases with time as each of the families has elaborated on the plan to follow based on the baseline captured by each *cogestor*. After this process, during the goal management stage, the *cogestores* stop the private visits and start using group sessions to track the improvement of the families. After this process if the family reaches the objectives within 5 years, they graduate from Red UNIDOS.<sup>6</sup> As an exit mechanism, households respond to a survey where the government can track the situation of the family using the Colombian version of the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).<sup>7</sup> The first role of the social worker is to diagnose the main barriers to the full development of each family, and this is a diagnostic that is done in close partnership with the family members. In no other social program does the social worker play such an active role in

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<sup>5</sup> See Appendix A for all basic goals.

<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that in the first stages of the process the involvement of each *Cogestor* is not strict. The real work begins from the family baseline onwards. The most important part of the strategy is the goals management; however, the dedication of each *Cogestor* is greater in the family baseline and family plan elaboration. The above gives us freedom so that the work of the *Cogestores* can be done by cohorts which helps in the strategy. This is because there will be a comparable control and treatment group for some time.

<sup>7</sup> To understand the Colombian methodology to measure de MPI see, <https://www.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K13UVjSONUc%3D&tabid=1192>



the core of each family's life. The articulation of the supply network is also innovative and difficult, as it involves coordination with several government departments. Given the state of these families, the potential impact of UNIDOS is extremely large but working with this type of population is also extremely difficult.

### **3. Women Empowerment, Intra-household Bargaining, and Labor Decisions**

Empowerment is often defined as, “increasing both the capacity of individuals or groups to make purposeful choices and their capacity to transform choices into actions and outcomes” (Petesch, Smulovitz, & Walton, 2005, p. 39). Gender relations are a critical factor for empowerment. In this sense, empowerment is related to the ability of making choices but also of controlling resources that give them power within and outside of the household. Following this line of reasoning, Molyneux defines women's empowerment as acquiring capabilities with the goal of assisting women in achieving autonomy (legal and material), equality (social and personal, i.e., status and self-esteem), as well as voice and influence over decisions that affect their lives (Molyneux, 2008).

Typically, the variables that have been used across contexts to measure empowerment have been education, employment, and participation in community programs. Employment allows women to earn an income, with a resulting positive impact on the social standing of women within the household and in society (Sen, 1999, p. 191). In terms of education, there is evidence that access to education improves women's capacity to question, to reflect on, and to gain access to information and make changes in their lives (Kabeer, 2005, p. 16). Indeed, empirical evidence has pointed out how women's empowerment is influenced by the ability to earn an income, employment outside the home, and their transformation into educated

participants in decisions within and outside of the family (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005, p. 91). The first aspect is particularly important as women's earning power contributes positively to add strength to their voice and agency. Specifically, having an independent income improves the social standing of women in the household –as it provides greater bargaining power.

According to Agarwal (1997), what determines the equality or inequality of bargaining power is the fallback position of individuals. In the context of intra-household bargaining, an individual's fallback position is largely determined by access to economic assets, which is directly tied to the capability of being able to survive outside of the household (Sen, 1981). If there is unequal access to strong fallback positions, then there is a situation of asymmetrical bargaining power where an unequal influence over decision-making in the household is present.

There is general agreement that the integration of women into the labor market is a key element in the measurement of empowerment (Kabeer, Mahmud, & Tasneem, 2011).<sup>8</sup> Since decisions (among married women) regarding labor supply are usually joint rather than individual, it is crucial to understand the intra-household decision-making process to adequately assess to what extent empowerment has been developed. Nevertheless, it is not easy to collect information on how decision-making power is allocated between different members of the household, for intra-household decisions (Ashraf, 2009). Most studies and methodologies do not allow understanding preferences or details on how the decision is made, and control over income does not imply control over other kinds of decisions, such as labor supply (Ashraf, 2009). Particularly in Latin America where the role of caretaking is solely concentrated on the mothers, controlling income and making decisions about the education of children and household expenses is not a proxy for empowerment and intra-household bargaining power.

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<sup>8</sup> See also, Sen (1999, p. 191) and Kabeer (2005, p. 16).

Recently, experiments have emerged as an alternative and novel method for studying household decision-making and intra-household bargaining; this, because experiments allow for the collection of data at individual and joint decisions under controlled conditions (Carlsson, He, Martinsson, Qin, & Sutter, 2012). Most intra-household decision-making experiments, such as the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak method (BDM), focus on “willingness to pay” (WTP) and control over household resources among husbands and wives. In WTP, experiments often measure the maximum amount an individual is willing to sacrifice to procure a good or avoid something undesirable (Becker, DeGroot, & J., 1964). One example is Ashraf’s (2009) analysis of the effects of information and communication on financial choices of married couples in the Philippines. In his experiment, the author found that making the couple’s financial choices public prevents husbands from allocating money for their own consumption, thus leaving more for their wives’ and children’s needs (Ashraf, 2009). Similarly, Carlson et al. (2012) made an experiment in rural China to estimate the relative influence of husbands and wives on each other’s individual preferences on household decisions. The authors found that both spouses have an influence on joint decisions but that husbands have a stronger influence over wives decisions than the other way around. Bateman and Munro (2004) developed an experiment where couples were asked to make choices individually and jointly and were asked to make predictions about their partner’s choices. They found that couples are more risk averse when making choices jointly compared to making individual choices. Gender is not a direct determinant of power in joint decisions, but female economic dependence significantly reduces women’s decisiveness in joint choice.

Similarly, Mani (2011) uses an experimental approach to analyze intra-household decisions in India. She finds that both men and women are willing to sacrifice much efficiency for greater personal control over household income. Surprisingly, the author finds that

inefficiency persists, even when spouses' control over household income is exogenously assigned: as a wife's assigned share increases, husbands undercut their own income to reduce hers (Many, 2011). For example, Iversen et al. (2006) tested core theories of household unitary and cooperative models using experimental data from 240 couples willingness to control income and bank accounts in rural Uganda. They concluded that couples do not maximize surplus from cooperation and realize a greater surplus when women are in charge.

Another framework used in experiments, mostly in marketing and other social research areas, is the "willingness to accept" (WTA) something. While the "willingness to pay" (WTP) usually measures the maximum amount individuals are willing to pay for controlling resources, the "willingness to accept" measures are the amount that a person is willing to accept or to abandon to get something in return (a 'good' in the case of marketing studies, a job, and so on) (Horowitz & McConnell, 2003). One example of this method is Bursztyn & Coffman's (2012) experiment in order to see a households willingness to accept a monthly government transfer conditional on their adolescent child attending school guaranteed, or higher amounts of unconditional transfers. Their results show that a majority of parents are more willing to accept a conditional transfer to larger unconditional transfers, unless they are offered text message notifications whenever their child misses school.

Instead of measuring household decision-making by the willingness to control resources, we modeled our experiment on Bursztyn and Coffman's design (2012), but instead focusing on women's willingness to accept a job given a number or hours, wages, and constraints. With this experiment we look for information regarding the minimum monetary amount that women are "willing to accept" (WTA) for selling their labor.

#### **4. The Experiment**

In this experiment, we measure women's willingness accept a job given a number of hours, wages, and other considerations. The design chosen responds first to previous evidence from studies about Red UNIDOS suggesting that, given the extreme poverty of beneficiary families, key intra-household bargaining issues are not based on the control of resources, since there is not much to have control over. In this sense, WTA is a more pertinent methodology when trying to understand decisions among extremely poor women. Indeed, one important difference between WTA and WTP is that WTA is not constrained by an individual's wealth. Therefore, WTA can be higher than the individual's wealth, and it will depend on the amount the individual wants to accept as compensation for what he or she is selling, or for the acquisition of something undesirable.

Secondly, in Colombia as in most Latin American countries, decisions over education and food related expenses culturally belong to women and therefore, few bargaining might be observed on those issues (Martinez et al., 2014). Third, studies demonstrate that labor participation is the most important instrument to reduce poverty (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2013) and is where women show greater vulnerability by having lower labor participation and wages than men, and higher informality than men. Finally, in Colombia, today about 30% of women are heads of households, and although information about composed families is not available, family structures have changed considerably in the last few decades (Ullmann, Maldonado, & Nieves, 2014). This implies that the traditional models of intra-household bargaining might take into account these complexities, mainly comparing how women heads of households make labor decisions compared to married women.

## *The Sample*

The recruiting process was based on information provided by the Red UNIDOS operator in Cali, at the Foundation for Family Counseling (FUNOF, in Spanish). Given ANSPE's denial on providing the full list (and contacts of beneficiaries in Cali), we asked the Foundation to randomly select a group of 800 women with children under 18, with the following characteristics: (i) 30% of women are heads of households, (ii) 70% of women are married or live with a partner, (iii) all of them have children under 18 years, (iv) all of them are under 50 years of age, (v) 70% are a displaced population, with the remaining 30% considered extremely poor according to the Colombian scoring mechanism SISBEN, and (vi) they are evenly distributed among different stages in the program; 33% are starting the program, 33% are in the middle (have attained some goals but not all), with a third group of 33% close to graduation (have attained most of the goals discussed in section 2 and are ready to leave the program). A list containing 973 women was provided containing these categories.

The recruiting process was made by randomly calling women from the list provided by FUNOF, given the stratification defined for the study. One third of women needed to be heads of households, one third married and coming to the experiment with their husbands, and the remaining third married and needing to come to the experiment alone. During the recruiting process, it was explained that a \$10 USD incentive would be given to participate in the experiment, which represent on average a daily wage for women with these socio economic and education characteristics. The experiment took place for four days, and two places were chosen in order to avoid lack of participation due to transportation difficulties and an overrepresented sample of a certain ethnicity. The greatest amount of Red UNIDOS were concentrated in the District of *Agua Blanca*, which is predominantly Afro-Colombian, and receiving displaced

people from the Pacific coast. The second setting, with 118 women, was Siloe, located on the western hills of the city, with a predominantly mixed and indigenous population and with displaced people from southern Colombia (Cauca and Nariño). A severely low compliance was found among this group in both settings, with a compliance of less than 50%. Assuming that men could not assist with the experiment since they were working,<sup>9</sup> another recall on a Saturday afternoon was made among the same couples that were confirmed but didn't show up to the experiment. This time, 31 couples went to the experiment. After this recall, the total compliance was 95%. This is explained mainly by the fact that, although most beneficiaries were concentrated around the two settings, others needed to come from other peripheral areas. The incentive was designed to be high enough to replace transportation costs and to replace the opportunity cost of not working for a day based on 80% of the legal minimum wage in Colombia, which is on average higher than what working women under extreme poverty or displacement would make in the labor market.

### ***The Setup***

To elicit the labor preferences and choices of these women we performed an experiment in which several hypothetical scenarios were applied and from which we measured their willingness to take a job, given several constraints. The women had to choose between working from home and being self-employed in the informal sector for a constant income of USD \$6 per day, or working outside the home for a salary that increased according to the number of hours worked. The latter scenario entailed a total of USD \$6 for four hours of work and up to USD \$16

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<sup>9</sup> This was also discussed with individuals making the recruitment calls. Many women said that their husbands could not assist because they needed to work.

for 10 hours of work, increasing by USD \$2 per each additional hour worked.<sup>10</sup> For each hypothetical scenario the women needed to take into consideration the following: 1) An increasing wage, given an increasing number of hours away from the home, inclusive of commuting time; 2) a constant USD \$1.5 cost of transportation; and 3) an increasing cost for care and supervision. In the first hypothetical round, all of the outside jobs are informal, and in the second hypothetical round, all of the jobs are formal and include health and pension benefits.

The study was divided into two different scenarios, formal and informal labor opportunities. Each of these different scenarios comprises of three situations in which each of the women involved in the study had to decide whether to stay in the home to work or leave the home to take advantage of a labor opportunity.

Each woman received two cases each with three scenarios;<sup>11</sup> the first for informal jobs and the second for formal jobs. In each scenario, each group had three different constraints: 1) an increasing salary, according to an increasing number of hours worked, starting at 4 and finishing at 10 hours per day, 2) \$1.5 US transportation fee per day, with two hours commute with return, and 3) the cost of childcare. While the first and the second constraints were held constant across all scenarios, both formal and informal, the price of care went from “0” or free, to \$1 US per day, which represents the price of public care,<sup>12</sup> to \$3.5 US, which corresponds to the price of a low quality private care outlet per day.<sup>13</sup> Women had to consider therefore whether they wanted to

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<sup>10</sup> The amount of money they were offered if they stayed home was 12,000 pesos (around 6 US dollars) and the amount they were offered if they leaved their house to work started at 12,000 pesos for 4 hours and augmented to 4,000 pesos (2 US dollars) for every additional hour, up to a maximum of 32,000 pesos (16 US dollars) for 9 working hours.

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix A

<sup>12</sup> By public care, we refer to services provided by the government through its ICBF, such as *Madres Comunitarias*. *Madres Comunitarias* are only accepting children before they enter primary school between the ages of 5-6. The specific example of what care service was free was given during the experiment.

<sup>13</sup> During the qualitative work performed some months before the experiment, we asked women what kind of informal daycares were available to them and what were their price. This was crucial since this information rarely



leave their kids in free or paid public or private childcare services.

For each possibility, women were asked what they would choose between, “Stay at home working on a small business making \$3 US per day” or “Work outside, for an amount, given a number of hours worked, deducting the cost of transportation and the cost care.” Given that this was a hypothetical scenario, we tried to make it as real and close to their lives as possible. The cost of transportation and daily average wage of displaced women and women under poverty was calculated from the Cali Household Survey (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2013), representative by neighborhoods (*Comunas*). Similarly, the information about care costs and availability was taken from household surveys and from the qualitative work performed some months before the experiment.

The process that was made with each woman included the following: the explanation of the experiment was made. Then, the game begun, the woman was queried which salary she preferred, taking into account the hours of work, hours of transportation, and the cost of childcare. Each “take it or leave it” included to earn 12,000 pesos working from home on a small business, or outside for an increasing income, given an increasing number of hours, a constant price of transportation (3000 pesos, or 1.5 US) and the price of care (free, 2,000 pesos or 1.5 US and 7,000 pesos or 3.5 US). The experimented was repeated both for an informal and a formal job.

This process was achieved through each of the different salaries offered until the breaking point appeared; that is, until the woman said she preferred to leave the house instead of

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appears on household surveys and prices vary significantly across cities. Most informal or private daycares have a cost of 7,000 Colombian pesos per day, or \$3.5 US, and are provided by female neighbors that invite children to their own, often overcrowded, homes.

staying in the house to earn 12,000 pesos. If the breaking point did not appear, even at the highest possible salary, then the process continued with each of the tables and each of the two scenarios; formal and informal employment opportunities. One third of the sample women went to the experiment with their husbands and we encouraged them to talk over the decision, as all decisions made at home. Couples from the latter group were invited to negotiate women's willingness to work.

### *Experimental Treatments and sample characteristics*

A total of 370 women participated in the experiment, with 70 percent having arrived in Cali due to displacement by violence and 30 percent being considered extremely poor under the Colombian scoring mechanism SISBEN. Among these women, 165 were the head of a household, 85 were married women who did not have their husbands present during the experiment, and 123 were married women who did have their husbands present during the experiment. Couples from the latter group were invited to negotiate women's willingness to work.

The sample averages are similar across the three groups. As seen in table 1, women are on average between 35 and 37 years old. A high percentage of the sample are women (and couples) displaced by violence (between 67% and 69% according to the group). This is because Red UNIDOS has a special priority to provide services to people migrating to cities due to violence. Furthermore, this number is higher than the national Red UNIDOS average, due to the fact that Cali is the main receiving city in the south west of Colombia. Wives and husbands' education is similar, rounding out around basic secondary (between 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> grade); the educational level of husbands was higher when the woman joined him in the experiment, which signals a lack of knowledge of the partners real educational status.

Some minor differences can be observed between labor participation, being higher (67%) for women heads of households than for married women with (44%) or without their husbands (55%). This, consistent with previous evidence, suggests that women heads of households and particularly displaced women are more likely to participate in the labor market due to the lack of other income sources. This factor also explains the difference in wages among the three groups. On average, women heads of households have a monthly income of 210.000 COP (\$110 US), vs. married women 163.176 COP (\$82 US), and married women with husbands 114.869 COP (\$57 US).<sup>14</sup> Indeed, labor participation is around the national urban average, and the value of wages can be explained by the fact that unemployed women and women without work were given “zero” wages which lowers the average of those women working. This is shown by the high standard errors shown in the table.

Furthermore, a difference is observed in the labor participation of husbands. This could be partially explained by the compliance challenge we faced with husbands, having perhaps a higher probability to apply the experiment to husbands with a lower opportunity cost (not working or with more flexible jobs). This can also explain the observed wage difference between married women that brought their husbands and those that did not. Other differences include the type of care used by each of the groups. The husband’s income could be biased when the husband was not in the experiment with the woman because of lack of knowledge by the woman of the real income her partner received. This is the same as the answer to whether the husband worked or not. It could be a different answer when the husband was with the woman because of a real knowledge of the subject. The most important type of childcare is the one performed by

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<sup>14</sup> Unemployed women and women without work were given a “zero” wage score which lowers the average of those women working. This is shown by the high standard errors displayed in the table.

the mothers themselves, which explains why they might prefer to have more labor flexibility than the informal sector could give them.

Finally, the number of kids between 7 and 18 years old is similar between married women but lower than the number of kids in households where the head of the family is a woman. The number of violent attacks in the last twelve months is interesting because of the differences between the samples; women who are household heads tend to say they've been prone to more attacks, the same as women who were not with their husbands, whereas women who were with their husbands say they've had the least.

**Table 1.**

*Descriptive statistics*

Variables	Head of household women	Married women with husband	Married women without husband
Displaced by violence	0.690 (0.039)	0.671 (0.055)	0.663 (0.047)
Age	37.266 (0.743)	35.246 (1.067)	35.624 (0.757)
Number of kids younger than 18	2.273 (0.117)	2.274 (0.165)	2.128 (0.121)
Number of people in the household	3.863 (0.226)	4.466 (0.335)	4.327 (0.251)
Education of women	5.926 (0.338)	6.205 (0.470)	6.546 (0.398)
Informality	0.540 (0.042)	0.493 (0.059)	0.426 (0.049)
Husband labor participation	- -	0.644 (0.056)	0.822 (0.038)

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Note: Mean/Std. Error

Note2: Income is codified by using the mean of each of the intervals in the questionnaire. The intervals from which women choose their income start in between 0 and 20,000 pesos, between 20,001 and 50,000, etc., up to over a million pesos.

### ***Experimental Outcomes and Empirical Specification***

The treatment used to see the different effects in the different kinds of women we had in the sample. That is, women heads of household, women who are actually married and went to the experiment with their husband, and finally women who were married but did not go to the experiment with their husband.

As for the outcome variable, various estimations were made because of the different elements this variable has. The variable determines at what point each woman decides to leave the house for a labor opportunity outside of it. We first estimated women's willingness to take a job with and Ordered Probit and performed a robustness check using a Tobit Model.

Outcomes are measured in money, and the amount varies according to the scenario. Table 2, shows the final amounts proposed for measuring women's willingness to take a job. The first methodology used is an Ordered Probit, with a categorical variable, in which the lowest value (1) is given to the lowest salary, that represents four hours worked, and 6 to the highest salary which represents 10 hours worked. A value of seven is given to women that are not willing to accept any job, expressing the higher opportunity cost.

Table 2, shows show this value changes according the deductions in terms of the cost of care and transportation. The outcome variables used in these experiments are the turning point in which the woman decides to leave the house for a job offer. Each of the different scenarios has different values because of the different costs each woman has to face in each situation. As an

example<sup>15</sup> in the first scenario, a woman gets an offer of 12,000 COP (6 USD) if she stays at home or 12,000 COP for 4 hours of work, but she has to consider other expenses such as the time she spends in transportation (2 hours back and forth), the cost of transportation for the day (3000 COP or 1.5 USD) and the amount she has to pay for childcare if she leaves. So, the decision, which will create the turning point if she decides to leave in the first situation, would be to choose between 12,000 COP for staying at home or 9,000 COP (12,000 offered for four hours of work outside her house minus 3,000 for transportation). So the variable would be 9,000 which would fall into the first category of the dependent variable.

Table 2.

*Women's willingness to take a job given salary, number of hours worked, cost of transportation and care*

Income staying at home	Informal job			Formal job		
	First scenario Free Care	Second Scenario	Third Scenario	First scenario Free Care	Second Scenario	Third Scenario
	Transportation 3000	Care =1 US Transportation 3000	Care 3.5 US Transportation 3000	Transportation 3000	Care =1 US Transportation 3000	Care 3.5 US Transportation 3000
12,000	9,000	7,000	2,000	9,000	7,000	2,000
12,000	13,000	11,000	6,000	13,000	11,000	6,000
12,000	17,000	15,000	10,000	17,000	15,000	10,000
12,000	21,000	19,000	14,000	21,000	19,000	14,000
12,000	25,000	23,000	18,000	25,000	23,000	18,000
12,000	29,000	27,000	22,000	29,000	27,000	22,000

Note: See Appendix A.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix A

The identification strategy using the Ordered Probit regression has the following form:

$$\Pr(y_{g=i}) = \Pr(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treat}_i + \beta_2 X + \epsilon)$$

Where  $y_g$  is the dependent categorical variable for each of the “g” scenarios.  $\text{Treat}_i$  each of the treatments given to the participants, 1 and 2, and  $X$  is a vector of covariates related to personal characteristics of the participant. The two treatments that were implemented in the experiment made were: women who attended to experiment with their husband and did the experiment with them in a discussion just as household decisions should be taken versus women who were married but did not go to the experiment with their husbands; and women who were married and went to the experiment with their husbands versus all the other women who went to the experiment, including married women who did not go with their husbands to the experiment and women who were not married and were head of the household.

### ***Treatment Results***

As seen in table 3, its important to note that the turning point average is high, women tend to accept the deal in most cases when the income outside is way higher than the income in the house, the turning point orbits around the higher levels of the categorical variable (over 3). That is, women tend to leave the house for a job opportunity when the salary offered is at least 50% higher than the one they would receive staying in their houses. In all six experiments the result is the same, but there is one important thing that has to be noted, the mean in experiments 4, 5 and 6 is lower than the one in experiments 1, 2 and 3, this could reveal that the preference of women do tend to be higher for formal jobs, which could say that they do not choose the formal job for the money offered but for the benefits it has.

Table 3  
*Turning point or willingness to take a job*

Outcome	Head of household women	Married women with husband	Married women without husband
Informal			
Experiment #1 Free child care	5.021898 (0.16817)	5.25 (0.2100283)	5.11 (0.2014568)
Experiment #2 Child care \$1US per day	5.26087 (0.1614177)	5.680556 (0.1843085)	5.52 (0.174356)
Experiment #3 Child care \$3,5 US	5.884058 (0.1345257)	6.194444 (0.1407543)	6.02 (0.143534)
Formal			
Experiment #4	4 (0.2390272)	4.308824 (0.2897558)	3.860465 (0.2793205)
Experiment #5	4.429825 (0.2344262)	4.647059 (0.2729901)	4.126437 (0.2768849)
Experiment #6	5.070175 (0.1953183)	5.220588 (0.2450973)	4.850575 (0.2366617)

Note: Mean/(std. Deviation)

### ***Treatment Effects***

The following tables have the effects of the first and second treatment made. We present in the first six tables the first treatment containing women who are married and went to the experiment with their husbands (Treatment = 1) compared to women who are married but did not go to the experiment with their husband (Treatment 1 = 0). Under this treatment, women heads of households are excluded from the sample. In this sense, the treatment group constitutes having the husband present in the experiment and the control group, and women married not having the husband present in the experiment. This should be able to show whether communication and



intra-household bargaining has any effect on women's willingness to accept a job during the experiment.

In the second six tables the comparison is made between women who are married and went to the experiment with their husband (Treatment 2 = 1) and women who are married and did not go to the experiment, plus women who are heads of households (Treatment 2 = 0). In this case, women heads of households and married women without their husbands are the control group. In this sense, the treatment group constitutes also having the husband present in the experiment, but this time the control group is constituted by married women not having the husband present in the experiment as well as women heads of households. In this scenario, we appreciate women who must negotiate their decision vs. women, married or not, who are not forced to negotiate their willingness to take a job.

It is important to note in tables numbered 4, 5, and 6, that Treatment 1 has a positive impact in choosing category number seven in the dependent variable, which is "Nor leaving the house." This means that the fact of being married with a husband and being with him in the experiment augments the probability of choosing not to leave the house for a job. Nevertheless, this effect is significant only when the experiment was applied during the formal job offer scenario. This could suggest that women have a higher preference for formal jobs at any given salary and wages, and given the existing transportation and childcare price constraints. This effect has a powerful impact since in the lower categories the sign is negative and is also significant. That is, women who are married and with their husbands have lower probabilities to leave the house for any amount of money.

Other control variables, such as the number of kids under 18 years of age in the

household, has an impact in the same direction which could reinforce the impact. *Familias en acción* (FEA) is a CCT sponsored by the government that helps people with children aged between 0 and 18 years old with monetary transfers conditioned to two aspects, nutrition and education. In our results, women who are part of FEA have an effect in the same direction as the impact mentioned by the treatment. That is, it increases the probability of choosing not to leave and decreases the probability of choosing any of the other possible offers the women had.

On the other hand, in tables 7, 8, and 9 the effect is also significant, but on the informal offer scenario. The treatment of women who went to the experiment with their husbands against the other women has a positive impact on choosing category seven, do not leave the house, over the other ones, and has a negative probability of choosing the first six categories that include leaving the house for any amount of money.

In this second treatment the covariate that has an impact in the same direction is the number of violent attacks in the last 12 months. This fact is very important in the analysis because this could be the reason why women do not want to leave the house for a job, due to fear of some violent act their children could be exposed to. Age is another covariate that has statistical significance and impact on the decision of the experiment made by women, especially in the informal labor proposals. As women are older the probability of choosing whichever option of leaving the home decreases and as women are older the probability of choosing the option of not leaving the home increases.

Table 4. *Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. married women who were not with their husbands.*

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 1, Informal job Free child care						
	Categories in the dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.00676 (0.00592)	-0.0310 (0.0228)	-0.0312 (0.0228)	-0.0143 (0.0106)	-0.00185 (0.00184)	0.000829 (0.00134)	0.0843 (0.0598)
Victim of Violence	0.000002 (0.000002)	0.000107 (0.000106)	0.000109 (0.000107)	5.05e-05 (0.000005)	0.0000006 (0.000008)	-0.0000002 (0.0000004)	-0.000293 (0.000286)
Age	-0.000324 (0.000340)	-0.00151 (0.00139)	-0.00154 (0.00142)	-0.000714 (0.000676)	-0.000009 (0.000112)	0.0000035 (0.000006)	0.00414 (0.00377)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00302 (0.00252)	-0.0141 (0.00988)	-0.0143 (0.0101)	-0.00666 (0.00481)	-0.000896 (0.000887)	0.000340 (0.000582)	0.0386 (0.0263)
Number of people in the household	0.000798 (0.00104)	0.00372 (0.00455)	0.00378 (0.00464)	0.00176 (0.00217)	0.000237 (0.000331)	-0.000008 (0.000179)	-0.0102 (0.0124)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	0.00156 (0.00912)	0.00746 (0.0449)	0.00779 (0.0482)	0.00378 (0.0243)	0.000579 (0.00415)	-0.000103 (0.000317)	-0.0211 (0.130)
Education of the women	-0.000482 (0.00126)	-0.00225 (0.00578)	-0.00228 (0.00588)	-0.00106 (0.00274)	-0.000143 (0.000382)	0.000005 (0.000163)	0.00617 (0.0158)
Informality	0.00576 (0.00561)	0.0265 (0.0227)	0.0267 (0.0224)	0.0123 (0.0104)	0.00158 (0.00172)	-0.000708 (0.00118)	-0.0720 (0.0597)
Husband labor participation	0.00164 (0.00518)	0.00775 (0.0245)	0.00800 (0.0257)	0.00381 (0.0125)	0.000552 (0.00197)	-0.000144 (0.000430)	-0.0216 (0.0694)
Observations	219	219	219	219	219	219	219

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 5. *Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. married women who were not with their husbands.*

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 2: Informal job Childcare cost = \$1US						
	Categories in the dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.00544 (0.00572)	-0.00455 (0.00478)	-0.0299 (0.0272)	-0.0179 (0.0165)	-0.0103 (0.00956)	-0.000696 (0.00101)	0.0688 (0.0619)
Victim of Violence	0.000001 (0.000002)	0.000001 (0.000002)	0.000009 (0.000126)	0.000006 (0.000007)	0.000003 (0.000004)	0.000002 (0.0000004)	-0.000230 (0.000289)
Age	-0.000385 (0.000356)	-0.000324 (0.000307)	-0.00215 (0.00169)	-0.00130 (0.00104)	-0.000752 (0.000622)	-0.000005 (0.000007)	0.00496 (0.00386)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00453 (0.00308)	-0.00381 (0.00272)	-0.0252** (0.0124)	-0.0152* (0.00786)	-0.00883* (0.00485)	-0.000633 (0.000778)	0.0583** (0.0276)
Number of people in the household	0.00114 (0.00112)	0.000960 (0.000968)	0.00635 (0.00554)	0.00384 (0.00339)	0.00223 (0.00200)	0.000159 (0.000225)	-0.0147 (0.0126)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.00642 (0.0147)	-0.00512 (0.0112)	-0.0316 (0.0628)	-0.0174 (0.0314)	-0.00850 (0.0124)	0.0000007 (0.00167)	0.0690 (0.130)
Education of the women	-0.000917 (0.00135)	-0.000771 (0.00114)	-0.00511 (0.00713)	-0.00309 (0.00434)	-0.00179 (0.00253)	-0.000128 (0.000229)	0.0118 (0.0164)
Informality	0.00483 (0.00549)	0.00404 (0.00471)	0.0266 (0.0273)	0.0159 (0.0163)	0.00913 (0.00945)	0.000617 (0.000945)	-0.0611 (0.0619)
Husband labor participation	0.00344 (0.00517)	0.00294 (0.00458)	0.0199 (0.0298)	0.0124 (0.0192)	0.00758 (0.0124)	0.000696 (0.00146)	-0.0470 (0.0715)
Observations	219	219	219	219	219	219	219

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 6. *Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. married women who were not with their husbands.*

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 3 Informal job Childcare cost = \$3.5US						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.00659 (0.00629)	-0.00186 (0.00238)	-0.00514 (0.00504)	-0.0262 (0.0215)	-0.0255 (0.0209)	-0.0129 (0.0107)	0.0781 (0.0629)
Victim of Violence	0.000002 (0.000002)	0.0000006 (0.000001)	0.000002 (0.000002)	0.000113 (0.000009)	0.000112 (0.000009)	0.000005 (0.000005)	-0.000341 (0.000289)
Age	-0.000315 (0.000358)	-0.000008 (0.000125)	-0.000248 (0.000285)	-0.00127 (0.00131)	-0.00125 (0.00129)	-0.000640 (0.000676)	0.00382 (0.00388)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00405 (0.00305)	-0.00115 (0.00130)	-0.00319 (0.00250)	-0.0163* (0.00981)	-0.0160* (0.00972)	-0.00821 (0.00523)	0.0490* (0.0283)
Number of people in the household	0.00102 (0.00115)	0.000289 (0.000410)	0.000800 (0.000929)	0.00409 (0.00427)	0.00403 (0.00420)	0.00206 (0.00218)	-0.0123 (0.0126)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.00632 (0.0154)	-0.00173 (0.00429)	-0.00470 (0.0108)	-0.0228 (0.0489)	-0.0207 (0.0410)	-0.00925 (0.0156)	0.0655 (0.135)
Education of the women	-0.00137 (0.00154)	-0.000389 (0.000538)	-0.00108 (0.00122)	-0.00551 (0.00560)	-0.00542 (0.00553)	-0.00277 (0.00289)	0.0165 (0.0166)
Informality	0.00573 (0.00597)	0.00162 (0.00220)	0.00448 (0.00484)	0.0228 (0.0216)	0.0223 (0.0208)	0.0113 (0.0106)	-0.0682 (0.0628)
Husband labor participation	0.00111 (0.00582)	0.000317 (0.00169)	0.000877 (0.00463)	0.00452 (0.0238)	0.00448 (0.0239)	0.00232 (0.0126)	-0.0136 (0.0723)
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217	217

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 7. *Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. Control 1: married women who were not with their husbands*

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 4 Formal job Free childcare						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.0908* (0.0546)	-0.0126 (0.00812)	-0.00532 (0.00393)	0.000120 (0.00141)	0.00427 (0.00349)	0.00523 (0.00377)	0.0990* (0.0587)
Displaced by Violence	0.00783 (0.00746)	0.00112 (0.00111)	0.000495 (0.000519)	0.0000007 (0.000122)	-0.000349 (0.000387)	-0.000443 (0.000459)	-0.00866 (0.00822)
Age	-0.00300 (0.00344)	-0.000431 (0.000509)	-0.000190 (0.000238)	-0.0000002 (0.000004)	0.000134 (0.000170)	0.000170 (0.000207)	0.00332 (0.00381)
Number of kids under 18	-0.0172 (0.0234)	-0.00247 (0.00344)	-0.00109 (0.00159)	-0.000001 (0.000269)	0.000767 (0.00113)	0.000973 (0.00139)	0.0190 (0.0259)
Number of people in the household	0.00156 (0.0119)	0.000224 (0.00171)	0.000009 (0.000752)	0.0000001 (2.64e-05)	-0.000006 (0.000532)	-0.000008 (0.000673)	-0.00172 (0.0131)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.222 (0.144)	-0.0130* (0.00670)	0.00362 (0.0126)	0.00851 (0.0103)	0.0198 (0.0179)	0.0167 (0.0133)	0.187** (0.0915)
Education of the women	0.00316 (0.0142)	0.000455 (0.00204)	0.000200 (0.000899)	0.000002 (0.000005)	-0.000141 (0.000639)	-0.000179 (0.000806)	-0.00350 (0.0157)
Informality	-0.0257 (0.0547)	-0.00369 (0.00791)	-0.00163 (0.00352)	-0.000002 (0.000402)	0.00115 (0.00252)	0.00146 (0.00314)	0.0284 (0.0604)
Husband labor participation	-0.0170 (0.0627)	-0.00237 (0.00854)	-0.00100	0.000002 (0.000340)	0.000802 (0.00316)	0.000982 (0.00373)	0.0185 (0.0676)
Observations	194	194	194	194	194	194	194

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 8. *Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. married women who were not with their husbands.*

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 5 Formal job, Childcare cost \$1US						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.104** (0.0491)	-0.0162* (0.00876)	-0.0156* (0.00826)	-0.00426 (0.00352)	0.00397 (0.00362)	0.00368 (0.00250)	0.132** (0.0607)
Displaced by Violence	0.00820 (0.00664)	0.00133 (0.00114)	0.00131 (0.00111)	0.000392 (0.000399)	-0.000277 (0.000330)	-0.000282 (0.000268)	-0.0107 (0.00858)
Age	-0.00243 (0.00304)	-0.000393 (0.000503)	-0.000388 (0.000500)	-0.000116 (0.000167)	8.22e-05 (0.000124)	8.36e-05 (0.000112)	0.00316 (0.00396)
Number of kids under 18	-0.0176 (0.0207)	-0.00285 (0.00344)	-0.00281 (0.00341)	-0.000843 (0.00115)	0.000596 (0.000861)	0.000606 (0.000772)	0.0229 (0.0269)
Number of people in the household	0.00672 (0.0105)	0.00109 (0.00174)	0.00107 (0.00171)	0.000322 (0.000546)	-0.000227 (0.000407)	-0.000231 (0.000380)	-0.00874 (0.0137)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.239* (0.141)	-0.0197*** (0.00739)	-0.00878 (0.0109)	0.0106 (0.0162)	0.0231 (0.0197)	0.0122 (0.00943)	0.221** (0.0934)
Education of the women	0.00670 (0.0125)	0.00108 (0.00205)	0.00107 (0.00201)	0.000321 (0.000626)	-0.000227 (0.000469)	-0.000231 (0.000446)	-0.00872 (0.0163)
Informality	-0.0218 (0.0482)	-0.00353 (0.00786)	-0.00348 (0.00774)	-0.00105 (0.00239)	0.000736 (0.00175)	0.000750 (0.00170)	0.0284 (0.0627)
Husband labor participation	0.00500 (0.0538)	0.000814 (0.00881)	0.000807 (0.00877)	0.000247 (0.00275)	-0.000163 (0.00169)	-0.000170 (0.00181)	-0.00654 (0.0706)
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 9. Treatment 1: Married women who were with their husbands vs. married women who were not with their husbands.

Ordered probit estimates	Scenario # 6 Formal job childcare cost = \$3.5US per day						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment1	-0.0543* (0.0297)	-0.0201* (0.0119)	-0.0268* (0.0152)	-0.0166* (0.00957)	-0.00625 (0.00449)	0.00272 (0.00295)	0.121* (0.0628)
Displaced by Violence	0.00472 (0.00370)	0.00179 (0.00147)	0.00242 (0.00194)	0.00153 (0.00124)	0.000613 (0.000556)	-0.000208 (0.000275)	-0.0109 (0.00835)
Age	-0.000714 (0.00176)	-0.000271 (0.000664)	-0.000366 (0.000901)	-0.000232 (0.000575)	-9.26e-05 (0.000235)	3.14e-05 (8.34e-05)	0.00164 (0.00403)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00599 (0.0121)	-0.00227 (0.00462)	-0.00308 (0.00624)	-0.00195 (0.00398)	-0.000777 (0.00164)	0.000264 (0.000599)	0.0138 (0.0279)
Number of people in the household	0.00447 (0.00619)	0.00170 (0.00239)	0.00229 (0.00322)	0.00145 (0.00204)	0.000580 (0.000853)	-0.000197 (0.000343)	-0.0103 (0.0142)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.106 (0.0957)	-0.0310 (0.0231)	-0.0355* (0.0213)	-0.0159** (0.00661)	0.00180 (0.0113)	0.0119 (0.0146)	0.174 (0.115)
Education of the women	0.00791 (0.00733)	0.00300 (0.00293)	0.00406 (0.00386)	0.00257 (0.00244)	0.00103 (0.00106)	-0.000348 (0.000491)	-0.0182 (0.0167)
Informality	-0.00271 (0.0278)	-0.00103 (0.0105)	-0.00139 (0.0143)	-0.000881 (0.00902)	-0.000352 (0.00361)	0.000119 (0.00123)	0.00625 (0.0640)
Husband labor participation	-0.0160 (0.0332)	-0.00592 (0.0121)	-0.00789 (0.0158)	-0.00486 (0.00951)	-0.00177 (0.00326)	0.000860 (0.00220)	0.0355 (0.0712)
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Table 10. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment # 1						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment2	-0.00915* (0.00532)	-0.0328** (0.0162)	-0.0437** (0.0220)	-0.0150* (0.00837)	-0.00209 (0.00203)	0.00105 (0.000941)	0.102** (0.0500)
Displaced by Violence	4.86e-05** (0.000002)	0.000170** (0.000006)	0.000220** (0.000008)	0.000007** (0.000003)	0.0000007 (0.0000008)	-0.0000007 (0.0000005)	-0.000509*** (0.000194)
Age	-0.000533 (0.000328)	-0.00187* (0.000988)	-0.00241* (0.00127)	-0.000780* (0.000436)	-0.000007 (0.000009)	0.000007 (0.000006)	0.00559* (0.00287)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00169 (0.00193)	-0.00591 (0.00658)	-0.00763 (0.00849)	-0.00247 (0.00277)	-0.000249 (0.000378)	0.000252 (0.000321)	0.0177 (0.0195)
Number of people in the household	0.000795 (0.000949)	0.00278 (0.00321)	0.00359 (0.00415)	0.00116 (0.00136)	0.000117 (0.000182)	-0.000119 (0.000156)	-0.00834 (0.00956)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	0.00509 (0.00642)	0.0191 (0.0251)	0.0266 (0.0375)	0.00977 (0.0154)	0.00175 (0.00381)	-0.000367 (0.000566)	-0.0619 (0.0876)
Education of the women	-0.000829 (0.00119)	-0.00290 (0.00410)	-0.00375 (0.00530)	-0.00121 (0.00172)	-0.000122 (0.000212)	0.000124 (0.000192)	0.00869 (0.0122)
Informality	-0.00389 (0.00464)	-0.0136 (0.0156)	-0.0176 (0.0203)	-0.00571 (0.00665)	-0.000587 (0.000910)	0.000574 (0.000745)	0.0408 (0.0467)
Husband labor participation	0.00348 (0.00563)	0.0126 (0.0207)	0.0170 (0.0289)	0.00588 (0.0107)	0.000844 (0.00201)	-0.000392 (0.000514)	-0.0394 (0.0672)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 11. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment # 2						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment 2	-0.0158** (0.00763)	-0.00713* (0.00414)	-0.0558** (0.0235)	-0.0287** (0.0131)	-0.0145* (0.00756)	-0.000650 (0.00103)	0.123** (0.0514)
Displaced by Violence	0.000006** (0.000003)	0.000002* (10.000001)	0.000214** (0.000009)	0.000106** (0.000004)	0.000004** (0.000002)	0.00000005 (0.0000003)	-0.000460** (0.000197)
Age	-0.000634 (0.000438)	-0.000281 (0.000213)	-0.00215 (0.00138)	-0.00106 (0.000700)	-0.000492 (0.000341)	-0.0000005 (0.000003)	0.00463 (0.00294)
Number of kids under 18	-0.00187 (0.00277)	-0.000831 (0.00126)	-0.00636 (0.00929)	-0.00314 (0.00461)	-0.00145 (0.00215)	-0.000001 (0.000104)	0.0137 (0.0199)
Number of people in the household	0.00128 (0.00138)	0.000566 (0.000642)	0.00433 (0.00457)	0.00214 (0.00227)	0.000990 (0.00107)	1.21e-05 (6.99e-05)	-0.00932 (0.00978)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	0.00671 (0.00963)	0.00308 (0.00469)	0.0247 (0.0378)	0.0131 (0.0215)	0.00692 (0.0127)	0.000418 (0.00128)	-0.0549 (0.0869)
Education of the women	-0.000163 (0.00173)	-7.21e-05 (0.000770)	-0.000552 (0.00589)	-0.000273 (0.00291)	-0.000126 (0.00135)	-1.54e-06 (1.85e-05)	0.00119 (0.0127)
Informality	-0.00159 (0.00660)	-0.000704 (0.00294)	-0.00538 (0.0224)	-0.00266 (0.0111)	-0.00123 (0.00514)	-1.55e-05 (0.000108)	0.0116 (0.0482)
Husband labor participation	0.00665 (0.00810)	0.00303 (0.00394)	0.0240 (0.0307)	0.0126 (0.0169)	0.00646 (0.00962)	0.000332 (0.000872)	-0.0531 (0.0693)
Observations	351	351	351	351	351	351	351

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 12. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment # 3						
	Categories in dependent variable						
ex3	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment 2	-0.0178** (0.00819)	-0.00159 (0.00169)	-0.00771* (0.00441)	-0.0426** (0.0174)	-0.0397** (0.0167)	-0.0222** (0.0105)	0.132** (0.0518)
Displaced by Violence	0.000009*** (0.000003)	0.0000008 (0.0000008)	0.000004* (0.000002)	0.000222*** (0.000007)	0.000200*** (0.000006)	0.000104*** (0.000003)	-0.000671*** (0.000200)
Age	-0.000575 (0.000456)	-0.000005 (6.28e-05)	-0.000245 (0.000210)	-0.00133 (0.00101)	-0.00120 (0.000915)	-0.000622 (0.000488)	0.00402 (0.00302)
Number of kids under 18	-0.000933 (0.00293)	-0.000008 (0.000271)	-0.000399 (0.00126)	-0.00216 (0.00676)	-0.00195 (0.00609)	-0.00101 (0.00317)	0.00653 (0.0204)
Number of people in the household	0.000734 (0.00143)	0.000006 (0.000141)	0.000313 (0.000619)	0.00170 (0.00328)	0.00153 (0.00296)	0.000795 (0.00154)	-0.00514 (0.00990)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	0.0123 (0.00893)	0.00114 (0.00140)	0.00560 (0.00474)	0.0323 (0.0256)	0.0323 (0.0281)	0.0204 (0.0209)	-0.104 (0.0866)
Education of the women	-0.000649 (0.00185)	-0.000005 (0.000172)	-0.000277 (0.000795)	-0.00150 (0.00428)	-0.00135 (0.00386)	-0.000703 (0.00201)	0.00454 (0.0129)
Informality	0.00298 (0.00709)	0.000264 (0.000676)	0.00127 (0.00306)	0.00690 (0.0164)	0.00620 (0.0147)	0.00322 (0.00763)	-0.0208 (0.0493)
Husband labor participation	-0.000689 (0.0103)	-6.09e-05 (0.000906)	-0.000294 (0.00436)	-0.00159 (0.0235)	-0.00142 (0.0210)	-0.000734 (0.0107)	0.00479 (0.0707)
Observations			349	349	349	349	349

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 13. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment # 4						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment 2	-0.0507 (0.0446)	-0.00630 (0.00591)	-0.00341 (0.00347)	0.000331 (0.000761)	0.00222 (0.00204)	0.00174 (0.00161)	0.0561 (0.0500)
Displaced by Violence	0.00368 (0.00563)	0.000443 (0.000684)	0.000228 (0.000359)	-0.000003 (0.000007)	-0.000172 (0.000270)	-0.000130 (0.000205)	-0.00401 (0.00613)
Age	-0.00211 (0.00272)	-0.000253 (0.000332)	-0.000130 (0.000177)	0.000002 (0.000004)	0.000009 (0.000132)	0.000007 (0.000100)	0.00230 (0.00296)
Number of kids under 18	-0.0147 (0.0177)	-0.00177 (0.00217)	-0.000912 (0.00116)	0.000143 (0.000277)	0.000687 (0.000868)	0.000522 (0.000657)	0.0161 (0.0193)
Number of people in the household	0.000713 (0.00987)	0.000008 (0.00119)	0.000004 (0.000611)	-0.0000006 (0.000009)	-0.000003 (0.000460)	-0.000002 (0.000349)	-0.000777 (0.0108)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.0285 (0.0820)	-0.00316 (0.00833)	-0.00142 (0.00317)	0.000470 (0.00193)	0.00149 (0.00475)	0.00107 (0.00326)	0.0301 (0.0836)
Education of the women	0.00733 (0.0114)	0.000881 (0.00138)	0.000453 (0.000729)	-0.000007 (0.000153)	-0.000341 (0.000545)	-0.000259 (0.000414)	-0.00799 (0.0124)
Informality	-0.0396 (0.0441)	-0.00474 (0.00536)	-0.00243 (0.00283)	0.000396 (0.000738)	0.00185 (0.00219)	0.00140 (0.00164)	0.0431 (0.0479)
Husband labor participation	-0.0445 (0.0636)	-0.00481 (0.00624)	-0.00208 (0.00227)	0.000808 (0.00179)	0.00239 (0.00391)	0.00169 (0.00264)	0.0465 (0.0637)
Observations			304	304	304	304	304

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 14. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment #5						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment 2	-0.0512 (0.0392)	-0.00799 (0.00655)	-0.00856 (0.00715)	-0.00153 (0.00170)	0.00160 (0.00151)	0.000996 (0.000860)	0.0667 (0.0518)
Displaced by Violence	0.00468 (0.00499)	0.000713 (0.000775)	0.000745 (0.000808)	0.000116 (0.000154)	-0.000168 (0.000204)	-0.000009 (0.000111)	-0.00599 (0.00637)
Age	-0.00188 (0.00239)	-0.000286 (0.000368)	-0.000298 (0.000388)	-0.000004 (0.000007)	0.000006 (0.000009)	0.000003 (0.000005)	0.00240 (0.00305)
Number of kids under 18	-0.0152 (0.0157)	-0.00232 (0.00245)	-0.00242 (0.00257)	-0.000378 (0.000495)	0.000546 (0.000649)	0.000312 (0.000353)	0.0195 (0.0201)
Number of people in the household	0.00580 (0.00870)	0.000882 (0.00134)	0.000922 (0.00140)	0.000144 (0.000243)	-0.000208 (0.000337)	-0.000119 (0.000187)	-0.00742 (0.0111)
Belongs to <i>Familias en Acción</i>	-0.0588 (0.0772)	-0.00780 (0.00900)	-0.00715 (0.00695)	-0.000187 (0.00167)	0.00318 (0.00554)	0.00144 (0.00222)	0.0693 (0.0838)
Education of the women	0.00897 (0.0101)	0.00137 (0.00157)	0.00143 (0.00163)	0.000222 (0.000306)	-0.000322 (0.000408)	-0.000184 (0.000224)	-0.0115 (0.0129)
Informality	-0.0372 (0.0390)	-0.00564 (0.00602)	-0.00588 (0.00627)	-0.000906 (0.00118)	0.00135 (0.00163)	0.000765 (0.000877)	0.0475 (0.0496)
Husband labor participation	-0.0305 (0.0560)	-0.00438 (0.00765)	-0.00435 (0.00717)	-0.000462 (0.000669)	0.00135 (0.00298)	0.000681 (0.00138)	0.0377 (0.0667)
Observations			305	305	305	305	305

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 15. Treatment 2: Married women who were with their husbands vs. all other women

Ordered probit estimates	Experiment # 6						
	Categories in dependent variable						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Treatment 2	-0.0357 (0.0229)	-0.0109 (0.00757)	-0.0177 (0.0120)	-0.0138 (0.00961)	-0.00419 (0.00345)	0.00123 (0.00137)	0.0812 (0.0528)
Violence	0.00300 (0.00290)	0.000904 (0.000899)	0.00145 (0.00141)	0.00110 (0.00108)	0.000307 (0.000323)	-0.000131 (0.000163)	-0.00663 (0.00635)
Age	0.000007 (0.00139)	0.000002 (0.000421)	0.000003 (0.000674)	0.000002 (0.000512)	0.0000007 (0.000142)	-0.0000003 (0.000006)	-0.000157 (0.00308)
Number of kids under 18 in the HH	-0.00308 (0.00929)	-0.000929 (0.00281)	-0.00149 (0.00449)	-0.00113 (0.00342)	-0.000315 (0.000961)	0.000135 (0.000419)	0.00681 (0.0205)
Number of people in the HH	0.00323 (0.00515)	0.000973 (0.00157)	0.00156 (0.00251)	0.00119 (0.00190)	0.000330 (0.000544)	-0.000141 (0.000252)	-0.00713 (0.0114)
Familias en acción	-0.0210 (0.0449)	-0.00604 (0.0124)	-0.00941 (0.0187)	-0.00673 (0.0125)	-0.00145 (0.00196)	0.00130 (0.00358)	0.0434 (0.0865)
Education of the women	0.0102* (0.00602)	0.00308 (0.00199)	0.00494 (0.00304)	0.00376 (0.00230)	0.00105 (0.000766)	-0.000446 (0.000440)	-0.0226* (0.0132)
Informality	-0.00384 (0.0228)	-0.00116 (0.00686)	-0.00185 (0.0110)	-0.00141 (0.00835)	-0.000392 (0.00232)	0.000168 (0.00101)	0.00848 (0.0502)
Does the Husband work?	-0.0304 (0.0358)	-0.00866 (0.00985)	-0.0134 (0.0146)	-0.00950 (0.00961)	-0.00194 (0.00167)	0.00196 (0.00310)	0.0619 (0.0672)
Observations			305	305	305	305	305

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **6. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks**

The integration of women into the labor market is a key element in the measurement of empowerment, and decisions among married women regarding labor supply are usually joint rather than individual, so it is crucial to understand the intra-household decision-making process to adequately assess the extent that empowerment has been developed. In this experiment we elicit the choices that women under extreme poverty make regarding a constant daily income from working at home in small and low-productivity businesses (such as cooking, sewing, and so on) against increasing their daily income by working outside the home as an employee, subject to the number of hours away from home, type of job (formal or informal), price of transportation, and the cost of care or supervision for children and/or adolescents.

Results indicate that intra-household negotiation does have an impact on women's willingness to take a job at different rates, particularly when it is an informal job without benefits. Women from the control group (those that brought their husbands to the experiment) were more likely to stay at home with a small entrepreneurship, earning \$6 US per day, rather than earning larger wages, than when compared to the control group (in one case married women without their husbands present), and in the second treatment both married women and women heads of households. Despite high levels of poverty, women with husbands prefer to stay at home or to work part time. Most reasons provided (see Table in Appendix A) for the decision in the turning point were to spend more time in the house with their kids, and a lack of trust with childcare services.

This is consistent qualitative evidence among Red UNIDOS beneficiaries in urban and rural areas of Colombia. Another barrier women face at home is the fact that their husbands or partners do not like them to work and their bargaining power is limited. Women reveal that this

is because their husbands often think that women working outside the home are going to cheat on them, since they are exposed to contact with other men and are more independent economically. Second, women also reveal that their husbands/partners argue that women are going to abandon or neglect children. According to the traditional family structures and roles, women stay at home taking care of children and men go to work bringing in money. Finally, when women work and have an income they gain autonomy and more bargaining power, and this implies they are no longer dependent on them.

This experiment, in addition, shows that, regardless of the wage level of their partner or husband, married women are less willing to take a job outside of the home despite offers of increasing wages and free childcare. This is particularly true for women with more children under 18, which suggests indeed that care has an important influence on labor decisions.

Women show an overwhelming preference for formal jobs where they can access pensions, health care, and other benefits, than where they are willing to take an informal job for any type of income. When asked the reason for their choice at the turning point, they suggested that they wanted more protection and stability, and other benefits such as vacation days. This is consistent with qualitative evidence among this population which suggests that most of the women interviewed work in the informal sector; however, they express a wish for getting a job in the formal sector. We found barriers for participation in the formal sector both at home and in the marketplace. At home, taking care of children is one of the main barriers for women's participation in the labor market. In the violent and insecure environment in which they live, children are exposed to risks such as violence, gangs, sexual harassment, and drugs. Consequently, they prefer to stay at home, earning occasional income from work they do there, such as selling food, doing laundry, and selling catalogs. These activities allow them to manage



their time while simultaneously looking after their children. In cases where they have left their children to go to work, they often feel guilty (Martinez-Restrepo et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, women interviewed during the qualitative work of the Red UNIDOS impact evaluation (Martinez-Restrepo et al., 2014) revealed also having faced obstacles such as age (being too old or too young) and lack of education, specifically the fact that some of them do not have a high school diploma, a requisite for most of the jobs in the formal sector; and in some cases, difficulties operating computers and technology in general.

As seen previously, under certain scenarios, mainly when the cost of childcare was at \$3.5 US per day, women with a greater number of children as well as married women are less likely to accept any given job at any given salary. When asked at the ‘no’ turning point, the reason for them wanting to stay at home for \$12 US per day, they included reasons such as the price and quality of care, followed by their fear of gang recruitment among adolescents, rape among young girls, and the price and availability of transportation. However, even when taken into account the aforementioned barriers, all women are more willing to take a job outside of the home if it offers pension and health benefits.

Women interviewed during the qualitative study mentioned being helped by Red UNIDOS overall for education and training purposes. They also mentioned support to open up a small business (access to low-cost microcredits), for instance a store at home. Some of them, mainly women displaced by violence, have received free housing (Vivienda Gratis). These results are consistent with previous evidence found about the effect of communication on intra-household bargaining (Ashraf, 2009) and men’s willingness to control resources. In this sense, since the experiment wanted to measure the willingness to accept a job, the control is exerted through the decision of the wife to not take a given job, unless it is formal.

This study also sheds new light on the discussion about the role of the cost, access, and quality of care and its impact on women's labor decisions. Public policy implications would dictate that free and high quality childcare in deprived urban areas can have a high impact on women's labor participation and therefore poverty reduction (when measured solely by income), than for example other regulatory policies, or labor matching programs offering jobs to these women. Nevertheless, as evidence has pointed out, it is not enough to think that care is over at the age of five, when children enter primary school. When asked the reasons of the turning point choice, women revealed that rape among young girls (ages 8-10) was very common, very often perpetrated by family members or even at the private or public day care.

Furthermore, women revealed that violence, gang recruitment, and high mortality rates among adolescents in their neighborhood was a barrier to accepting or looking for jobs outside of their homes. In fact, although violence rates and violent deaths are down compared to 2000, Colombia has the second highest youth homicide rate in the world: Salvador (92.3), Colombia (73.4), Venezuela (64.2), Guatemala (55.4), and Brazil (51.6) (World Health Organization, 2011). Also, according to the Survey of Coexistence and Citizen Security, the rate of victimization in Colombia reaches 18.8% of the population (2.8 million people) (DANE, 2013), which is mostly perpetrated by young men. This victimization includes thefts of homes and people, quarrels and fights, and extortions and thefts of vehicles in 20 major cities. Similarly, data in Legal Medicine 2011 shows that 91% of violent deaths are men and that about 55% of victims of violent deaths are under 24 years of age and live in urban areas, Cali and Medellin being the highest rates (Ricaurte, 2011).

This implies that "Care" must be defined most broadly, since teenagers also need supervision after school (which in Colombian public schools last only 4 hours per day. Care for

adolescents must include extracurricular activities, support to sports and cultural activities, that have demonstrated lower the probability of incurring risky behaviors (Martínez-Restrepo, 2012).

Small entrepreneurships are the best option for these women, since they can work while supervising their underage children. Although income-generating strategies (such as microcredits) often reinforce informality and precarious jobs, without the necessary access to care services, transportation, and changes in cultural patterns, it remains the best option that women under extreme poverty have.

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## APPENDIX A. Experiment and methods

The following tables were the ones that each woman received in the experiment, the first one is the informal scenarios they were offered and the second one was the formal one.

Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decisión	
Work at home	vs.	Informal work outside home	Hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
12.000		12.000	4 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	9.000		
12.000		16.000	5 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	13.000		
12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	17.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	21.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	25.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	29.000		

Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decisión	
Work at home	vs.	Informal work outside home	Hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
12.000		12.000	4 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	7.000		
12.000		16.000	5 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	11.000		
12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	15.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	19.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	23.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	27.000		

Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decisión	
Work at home	vs.	Informal work outside home	Hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
12.000		12.000	4 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	2.000		
12.000		16.000	5 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	6.000		
12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	10.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	14.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	18.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	22.000		

In this tables, the turning point was constructed in the column “which one do you prefer” in the moment were the woman said she preferred to leave the house for the job. If she did not want to leave the house in any situation then this turning point would be category number seven of the outcome variable.

The other columns are the ones which were part of the decision the woman did, the hours worked, the time and cost of transportation, and the cost of childcare. In the column “why”, the woman was asked why she took her decision and as the answers were so different they were categorized into 6 different possible answers (shown after the other table of decision)



Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decision	
Work at home	vs.	Formal work outside home	hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
12.000		12.000	4 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	9.000		
12.000		16.000	5 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	13.000		
12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	17.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	21.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	25.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	0	12.000	29.000		

Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decision	
Work at home	vs.	Formal work outside home	hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
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12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	15.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	19.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	23.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	2000	12.000	27.000		

Type of work			Time outside home		Costs		Available money		Decision	
Work at home	vs.	Formal work outside home	hours worked	Time of transportation (back and forth)	Cost of transportation	Cost of childcare	Available money staying home	Available money leaving home	Which one do you prefer?	why?
[1]		[2]								
12.000		12.000	4 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	2.000		
12.000		16.000	5 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	6.000		
12.000		20.000	6 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	10.000		
12.000		24.000	7 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	14.000		
12.000		28.000	8 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	18.000		
12.000		32.000	9 hours	2	3000	7000	12.000	22.000		

Options for the decision in the turning point	
a.	More money
b.	Wants to spend more time in the house
c.	Informality, more flexibility
d.	Formality, more protection, more stability
e.	The cost of childcare is too high
77	Other reasons